Art, Science and Simulation

By Mario Rosaldo

The insistence of the critique of architecture, of scientist trend, on stating its ideas by means of a terminology formally comparable to the scientific language is nothing new at all. In general, it obeys to the wrong perception according to which the new words or the abstract redefinitions can alter reality. However, the history of science proves us that the changes in its concepts and theories did not take place with anticipation, that they were not the direct consequence of the invention of neologisms, but the result of a long and slow process of experimentation and reasoning. Science could purify the common language to convert it into a properly scientific language, only after a certain development. This did not happen the other way round. The present discussion about the proper use of the scientific concepts such as conjecture, theory and scientific method, or about the interpretations they deserve, rather belongs to the domain of the philosophy of science. That is to say, we often forget that science as a historical and philosophical concept differs a great deal from science as reality. We can base our hopes or wishes on science, but as a matter of fact science does not work in function of our expectations.

Thus, it is not enough to simply introduce a terminology coming from philosophy or psychology to derive benefits from it. It is not enough either to simply define architecture as a science to disappear the ethical and political problem stated by the early 20th-century avant-gardes, or to end the debates about its definition. Certainly, it is completely justified to use the qualifying phrase of science or sciences of architecture, if we take into account that art in its origin signified technique, in the sense of the science or knowledge that a man possesses to do something with skill and ability. But, if the idea is to compare architecture to the natural sciences or the social sciences, by means of the establishment or application of a biased terminology and scientific method, then we are not only proceeding in a completely antiscientific way, but we are besides attempting to put a stop to a debate like the one that accompanied the emergence of science during the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries.

Art contributed from the beginning to this debate, by defining itself as part of the new science, or by defending its metaphysical heritage. This debate, which has been the origin of its theory and critique, has not ended for art. Let us see this quickly. In 1550 Giorgio Vasari (1511-1574) upholds the thesis according to which the Ancients and the Moderns (in this case the Tuscan artists) possess a science and a technique that surpasses “the German work of the time of the Gothics”, which in addition he considers empiric and improvised: a piling of stones upon stones. These first traces of nationalism and rationalism will be presented with greater clarity during the 17th and 18th centuries.

In France the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns helps centre the discussion more on how to relate art with science than on denying the possibility of this relationship. From that very moment the search for the laws or rules of beauty starts and soon leads to the theory of taste. In 1683, Claude Perrault (1613-1688) exposes the theory that modern architecture can differ from the usages of the ancient architecture in view of the fact that art, as science, requires a continuous improvement. In 1714, Sebastien Le Cler (1637-1714) maintains that the proportions of the classic orders depend on the architect’s good taste, for that reason his education must be based on practical knowledge and on the consideration that geometry is merely a point of departure. These theories contribute no doubt to develop the French architecture in a very particular way, relatively separated from the Italian one.

In Germany, in 1764 Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768) opts to study history and critique of art based on an empirical work, while his analysis of Greek and Roman sculpture proves that artistic evolution is not necessarily progressive. In 1766, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) prefers to prove “that among the ancients, beauty was the supreme law of the plastic arts”, by studying rationally the classic texts. In 1790, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) endorses the idea of the autonomy of art when stating that this one is not valuable because of its utility, but because of the pleasure it communicates; that this one is not a salaried job but a free work. In England, en 1815 Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) sketches his theory of a special logic for art, as rigorous as scientific reasoning. In 1843 John Ruskin (1819-1900) argues that the truth of nature can be discerned only by the educated senses of a painter. In Germany, in 1886 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900) upholds that in art being a scientist is interpreting or studying art from the original sense of life, from what life is when the Christian moral consciousness ceases.

In France, in 1870 Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893) proposes to study the milieu where artist is born, so that it can be possible to determine the psychological experience which leads artist to conceive his work. In 1874 Claude-Oscar Monet (1840-1920) enriches the concept of realism in painting by focusing on the study of plein air, on the fleeting effects of light on landscape. The public rejection to the new painting leads Monet, Alfred Sisley (1839-1899), Camille-Jacob Pissarro (1830-1903), Auguste-Pierre Renoir (1841-1919) and Berthe Morisot (1841-1895) to declare that the impressionist painter is perfectly sincere, that he paints only what he sees, that he is faithful to nature. In Germany, in 1881 Konrad Fiedler (1841-1895) responds to the impressionists that the visual perception is a process much more complex than the simple act of seeing. In 1893 Adolf von Hildebrand (1847-1921), agreeing with Fiedler, suggests to base the aesthetic appreciation no longer on sight but on tact, or rather, on a tactile or three-dimensional perception of object. En 1896 Alois Riegl (1858-1905) makes attempts to establish a history of art based on objective values; he studies styles and their formal variations through history and conceives the idea according to which intentions reveal a Kunstwollen.

In the 20th century, the main trend of the Modern Movement is to establish an alliance between the artist’s spiritual components and the objective social practice. During the first half of that century, critique of art is profoundly influenced by psychology, psychoanalysis, linguistics, Marxism, and anthropology. However, from the 1960’s on, influences come chiefly from two sources, the liberal one represented by philosophers like Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), Karl Popper (1902-1994), Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) or Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997), and the poststructuralist one with philosophers like Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) or Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), who head what at that moment is supposed to be an option to the extreme right and left positions.

This great variety of approaches that claim to be settled on the scientific vision of reality, that argue that science is not free from the influences of spiritual movements, or that reduce the study of reality to the study of language or knowledge, generate directly or indirectly in the critique of art, in the critique of architecture, both rational and irrational attitudes, both empirical and metaphysical approaches. That is the reason why critique is sometimes inclined to enact the idea of a science of art completely different from the science of nature. That is, a science where the irrational goes hand in hand with the rational, or the empirical with the rhetoric. But we cannot consider in any way this inclination ―sometimes eclectic, sometimes relativistic― as the single best way to see art. In any case, it is better to admit that the debate in question is still going on, that the final word still has not been said. What we must never allow is that critique becomes a simulation, a cheap parody in which effort and study are replaced by wordiness. Simulated critique only seeks to undermine the right and freedom of individuals to express systematically their dissent, to sustain rigorously and rationally their own points of view.

To Break Inertia and Renew the Critical Attitude in Architecture

By Mario Rosaldo

If we start to study seriously the recent theories and critiques of architecture, let us say, from the 1980’s to the present day, we shall see that the sophistication, which their methods, themes and terminologies have achieved with respect to their equals of the 1960’s and 1970’s, can be put down mostly to their interest in establishing themselves as scientific or multidisciplinary paradigms; or on the contrary, simply as theories and critiques founded on the forms of the so-called irrationalism, or antirationalism. Between these extremes we often find, as a general rule, the conciliatory attitudes: the solutions which, avoiding siding with radicals or reactionaries, prefer the comfort of neutrality, or even that of the eclecticism. We can agree to consider the conciliatory critique as morally beneficial and desirable, or the idea of a pluralistic critique, a critique opened to dialogue adopting no extreme or absolute positions, as very successful. But the fact is that the so-called pluralism not always includes all of the critics, it tends to leave out monists, and all those who do not accept the model of the liberal democracy. For, when pluralists say to respect rationalists or idealists, depending on the adversary in turn, they usually consider the others wrong. This pluralistic inclusion becomes the customs post where the supporters of liberalism receive a preferential treatment. Conciliation founded on such a pretended equality or inclusion of all the trends is not but a barely hidden imposition of the old cultural relativism of the academic anthropology.

The dialogue between critics as the dialogue in general is a reflection on our knowledge, on our study, but also on the knowledge of our interlocutors. It is this reflection caused by the encounter which enriches critic, which leaves him lessons sometimes unexpected. But improvisation cannot replace method, and its practice should be declared so that no one can take it too seriously. Such theories and critiques, worried as they are about establishing as the new paradigms, have neglected the thorough study of the sources on which they say they are based: critics have been content so far with third-party opinions. This has been so because, on the one hand, they assume that the theories on which they rest are the most advanced. And, on the other, they are victims of the rush and the practical exigencies of our times. They get rid of theories and critiques at the stroke of the pen, simply by adopting the latest fashionable theory. There are really a few critics who devote a serious study to the author in question, who take into account not only what has been said and written about this author, but above all what has been stated by he himself. That is why here we should like to invite the official theoreticians and critics of architecture to allow authors, to whom they usually praise or ridicule, to speak in his defence. To judge authors by the third-party interpretations of their thoughts or writings–being favourable or not–is not only morally unfair, but at the same time logically absurd.

As we cannot wait for things to happen, it should be advisable as well to invite the reader of theories and critiques to carry out his own studies and examinations, not depending exclusively on third-party opinions, even in the case of renowned interpreters of a certain author. It is not a question of setting aside the existent theories and critiques of architecture, but of confronting them and subjecting them to a study revealing their successes and failures, their scopes and limits. To rely on the excuse that theories and critiques are irrelevant and therefore an unnecessary study, because of the presumption that they are old or deal with old issues, is a paradoxical argument showing us at least that we think in accordance with the epoch, that we do not have ideas of our own, that we are not originals at all, that we are merely driven by the current and the inertia of tradition. A critical study of the classic sources, of the authors who are the necessary points of reference for architecture and in general for any critique, are useful in the first place to find out what was really said by these authors on a particular theme, and in the second place to outline our own approach to it, that is to say, to the third-party interpretations or to the thought itself of the mentioned traditional sources or points of reference. The only safe method of becoming an attentive and creative critic is to make study a daily practice by searching, exploring, comparing, but above all by not accepting to simply repeat what the others say, nor adopting or defending theories before studying them thoroughly.

As we discussed in last month’s article, a critique is only an essay, an initial approach to the object of study. In addition, we cannot say it is not important to know who the author is, for the veracity of the critique–or the lack thereof–is determined by the author’s theoretical or political biases. Nevertheless, though it is true that critiques can be differentiated by the quality, the rigour or the seriousness with which they are carried out, this can be only contingently attributed to the author’s fame, in this case an architect, a historian, or a philosopher. Most of the time critiques come into fashion because they deal with themes–or use terms–surprising pleasantly a public avid for novelties and irreverent arguments against the rigidity of academy, and in general against the rigidity of all the institutions of State and society. It is until the ludic and, at the same time, reverent stage of the favourite critiques of the epoch ends when public realizes that those had been refuted by the adverse critique, even from the very beginning. Thus, in spite of the good intentions or because of a lack thereof, we can find many critiques–and many theories as well–that become a thick smoke curtain confusing and deviating readers to keep them away from the study of the classic sources, from the study of the necessary points of reference; to make them believe instead that study is a matter for initiates or selected people. Willingly or reluctantly, these critiques and theories turn into an obstacle to be overcome, in place of being a magnet attracting the general interest.

In other words, the architect or the student of architecture who wants to break inertia or needs to renew his critical attitude should start by confronting the theories and critiques they have taught him against the sources on which the authors are based: he should read and study thoroughly the original texts of such sources in order to be in a position to know whether the interpretation is faithful to them or not, whether it adds something else or not. Likewise, he should identify the authors’ theoretical and political affiliations in order to establish what coincidences and differences he shares with them. He may side with any of the current trends of the debate, or he may try to remain neutral. Indeed, the critical debate includes both the opinion that objectivity is possible only if no stand is taken, only if critic remains neutral and disinterested, and the opinion that there is no objectivity without recognising that subjectivity plays an active role during the knowledge process, without admitting that critic is always involved in the object of his study. The opposite extreme to these opinions is that of the consideration that only subjectivity can reach the intuition of the human nature and their creations. The only way we have to understand each critical trend of the debate is by putting oneself in its place. And that means to take sides, even though it is merely a temporary choice. Of course in practice we can take sides, or even choose an independent or neutral position, without having studied meticulously the opponent, but in critique and in theory knowledge is the base of reflection, thus it is necessary to study seriously each position of the critical debate.

The classic sources or references can be studied disjointedly according to our necessities, but in order to avoid misinterpreting their central thesis it is advisable to study them first in function of themselves. That is to say, it is preferable to follow first their own discourse until determining what thesis they uphold or what theory they intend to build up; so that we can make clear their meaning. Once this work is done, it is time to reflect on the material which has resulted from our study, always checking against the referential discourse. We may consider all this effort only as the first approach to an author’s theory and we may work for the moment with the first obtained conclusions, knowing that they can be changed after a second or a third new study. If we publish our conclusions, we may call attention to the fact that they are provisional, that they are subject to future corrections. It is very typical of us to assume that the architectural theories and critiques we have read are already definite conclusions and therefore unmovable points of view. Some authors, even considering their conclusions provisional, insist on defending them as if they were unbeatable or irrefutable, as if they were the last and the definite ones. It is obvious that a campaign to disseminate our conclusions is not going to convert them into more objective or scientific ones, but it certainly can stifle debate as a campaign like this makes people think that there is no other theory but the one promoted. Let us avoid doing this as well.

Critique of Art, Intuition, and Objectivity

By Mario Rosaldo

Despite the fact that the present critique of art, including the critique of architecture, approaches themes or problems with a greater number of resources than we had a century ago, the old trends are still running and attracting followers. Thus, we all can see, manifested in the new generations, the different forms of positivism, pragmatism and, in general, the so-called irrationalism. All of them resulting trends from the originally scholastic debates between rationalists or empiricists and metaphysicians. At present, some critics oppose very often intuition to reasoning as the only way or method to determine history of art, or to grasp–or catch a glimpse–of any phenomenon. They do not accept at all that a reasonable examination of human phenomenon can be possible. Other critics hold very frequently, as well, completely contrary opinions. These are the “scientificists” for whom nothing is more valid than the method of natural sciences, or social sciences, applied to the study of art, or–in our particular case–of architecture. Of course we also find eclectic and relativist critics, and improvisers or opportunists, not to mention amateurs or dilettantes.

For this time, let us see the first two cases only. Let us start by asking ourselves what thing is leading “intuitionist” critics to neglect the resource of reason. Their first argument says that science has failed as it has been incapable of explaining reality, nature. From such an opinion they deduce the idea that rigorous logic and mathematical reasoning also fail if an explanation on the metaphysic part of man is requested. The second argument says that objectivity is valid for dead things only, not for living beings: only things entirely dead stop their transformation. The third argument says that absolute objectivity does not exist as critic and scientist alter the phenomenon with their instruments of analysis, with their senses, with their prejudices. The fourth argument says that the spiritual can be known only from within. The physical belongs to natural science, the spiritual to psychology. In the main, the argument says that we can measure things external to man: his body and the world around, or which he can perceive with their senses, or by the extension of these, but not his inside, not his spirit. For some, it is intuition, for others, it is intersubjectivity or simply subjectivity, the only thing that can reach the essence of man.

It seems to us that the first argument is founded on a philosophical concept, not on a scientific one, of reality. For science, reality is a process or rather a series of processes; consequently, it is not an objective of science to give a complete and definite explanation of reality. It is not a failure of science to limit itself to observe the phenomenal developments by means of models describing them. It is philosophy which aspires to the general truth; science progresses only through theories or hypothesis and the experimental corroboration, correction, or refutation of each of them. The second argument makes objectivity a synonym of physical things, but, as a matter of fact, objectivity is also referring to things or objects–some say disapprovingly “artefacts”– created by mind. Actually, we objectify what our mind captures from reality: thinking is objectified by speaking and writing. This way, a critic or a scientist, or any thinker from present or past, can be studied through his texts left behind. We will not observe directly the subject, but certainly the mental objects created by him.

The third argument, as the above mentioned ones, is founded on an absolutist concept, in this case, of objectivity and analysis. The objective work is mistakenly expected to be infallible and ultimate. Things are quite different; such a work is objective because it defines an object of study and makes an effort to define this accurately according to the most rigorous method, but the result is always an approximation, never an end or an absolute. We often forget that the work of a critic and a scientist is collective. Each of them contribute with a small portion; whether they work in group or alone, provided that they bear in mind that they take part of a generation and a community. The belief in an isolated genius possessing the whole truth, it is not but a romantic vision. The fourth argument favours psychology either for being apparently a science of spirit, or for being traditionally the shelter of some supporters of the philosophy of life and the before mentioned pragmatism. Nevertheless, psychology does not favour–at least not in its history–solely this “intuitionist” approach. All this is a question of a rather biased interpretation, or a partial choice, of what social or natural sciences are at present.

In their quest to overcome the materialist viewpoint, those critics betting on intuition and refuting reason, even accepting the unity of matter and spirit, take refuge in subjectivity forgetting that this one exists not only in connection with the objects and the processes of perception, not only in opposition to objectivity, but above all in connection with material life. For their part, the scientificistic critics fall as well into absolutist concepts. They are convinced that the simple choice of the “scientific method” is guarantee in itself of impartial and objective results, logically rigorous. But this is not thoroughly true. These critics, who sometimes prefer speaking of “analysis”, not of “critique”–because of the itch of analogies–, usually build their models and theories in a very typical way, by breaking up with the methodical recommended guidelines. They do not state a hypothesis to corroborate it, or to refute it on the testing bench, nor carry out a research to subject it to all sorts of critiques before the printed exposition of the conclusions. They rather work the other way: they start from the pretended conclusions to construct later the justificatory arguments which can make us believe that those were reached in the end by following a “scientific” way. That is why they usually confound or mix up research with exposition.

Naturally, it is not enough the scientific appearance of a study to take this for granted. It is not enough either to believe that the simple use of the concepts taken from the natural sciences solve the problem of objectivity. It is not enough to substitute “scientific analysis” for “critique” or vice versa. It is true that an analysis of laboratory can be applied to the study of art, to the study of architecture, but, for avoiding falling into a mechanical attitude of evaluation; critique must be present from the beginning to the end; from the very moment the method of research is chosen, the guiding concepts are defined, the first ideas are stated, etc., until the moment the model is created and the conclusions are obtained, even until the final exposition is written. A study is always an initial approach, an essay. For that reason, in order to get closer to objectivity, we must become aware from the beginning of the prejudices that make us choose one approach or another, one treatment of the theme or another. To believe that an analysis of laboratory guarantees in itself an objective critique of art, it is not only a mistake, but in addition it is an illusion, a prejudice. Prejudices do not stay out of the laboratory when the scientist enters in there, but the fact that he works more with samples of materials than with mental objects is such a great help. The critic of art, the critical architect, is more defenceless against prejudices.