By Mario Rosaldo
Despite the fact that the present critique of art, including the critique of architecture, approaches themes or problems with a greater number of resources than we had a century ago, the old trends are still running and attracting followers. Thus, we all can see, manifested in the new generations, the different forms of positivism, pragmatism and, in general, the so-called irrationalism. All of them resulting trends from the originally scholastic debates between rationalists or empiricists and metaphysicians. At present, some critics oppose very often intuition to reasoning as the only way or method to determine history of art, or to grasp–or catch a glimpse–of any phenomenon. They do not accept at all that a reasonable examination of human phenomenon can be possible. Other critics hold very frequently, as well, completely contrary opinions. These are the “scientificists” for whom nothing is more valid than the method of natural sciences, or social sciences, applied to the study of art, or–in our particular case–of architecture. Of course we also find eclectic and relativist critics, and improvisers or opportunists, not to mention amateurs or dilettantes.
For this time, let us see the first two cases only. Let us start by asking ourselves what thing is leading “intuitionist” critics to neglect the resource of reason. Their first argument says that science has failed as it has been incapable of explaining reality, nature. From such an opinion they deduce the idea that rigorous logic and mathematical reasoning also fail if an explanation on the metaphysic part of man is requested. The second argument says that objectivity is valid for dead things only, not for living beings: only things entirely dead stop their transformation. The third argument says that absolute objectivity does not exist as critic and scientist alter the phenomenon with their instruments of analysis, with their senses, with their prejudices. The fourth argument says that the spiritual can be known only from within. The physical belongs to natural science, the spiritual to psychology. In the main, the argument says that we can measure things external to man: his body and the world around, or which he can perceive with their senses, or by the extension of these, but not his inside, not his spirit. For some, it is intuition, for others, it is intersubjectivity or simply subjectivity, the only thing that can reach the essence of man.
It seems to us that the first argument is founded on a philosophical concept, not on a scientific one, of reality. For science, reality is a process or rather a series of processes; consequently, it is not an objective of science to give a complete and definite explanation of reality. It is not a failure of science to limit itself to observe the phenomenal developments by means of models describing them. It is philosophy which aspires to the general truth; science progresses only through theories or hypothesis and the experimental corroboration, correction, or refutation of each of them. The second argument makes objectivity a synonym of physical things, but, as a matter of fact, objectivity is also referring to things or objects–some say disapprovingly “artefacts”– created by mind. Actually, we objectify what our mind captures from reality: thinking is objectified by speaking and writing. This way, a critic or a scientist, or any thinker from present or past, can be studied through his texts left behind. We will not observe directly the subject, but certainly the mental objects created by him.
The third argument, as the above mentioned ones, is founded on an absolutist concept, in this case, of objectivity and analysis. The objective work is mistakenly expected to be infallible and ultimate. Things are quite different; such a work is objective because it defines an object of study and makes an effort to define this accurately according to the most rigorous method, but the result is always an approximation, never an end or an absolute. We often forget that the work of a critic and a scientist is collective. Each of them contribute with a small portion; whether they work in group or alone, provided that they bear in mind that they take part of a generation and a community. The belief in an isolated genius possessing the whole truth, it is not but a romantic vision. The fourth argument favours psychology either for being apparently a science of spirit, or for being traditionally the shelter of some supporters of the philosophy of life and the before mentioned pragmatism. Nevertheless, psychology does not favour–at least not in its history–solely this “intuitionist” approach. All this is a question of a rather biased interpretation, or a partial choice, of what social or natural sciences are at present.
In their quest to overcome the materialist viewpoint, those critics betting on intuition and refuting reason, even accepting the unity of matter and spirit, take refuge in subjectivity forgetting that this one exists not only in connection with the objects and the processes of perception, not only in opposition to objectivity, but above all in connection with material life. For their part, the scientificistic critics fall as well into absolutist concepts. They are convinced that the simple choice of the “scientific method” is guarantee in itself of impartial and objective results, logically rigorous. But this is not thoroughly true. These critics, who sometimes prefer speaking of “analysis”, not of “critique”–because of the itch of analogies–, usually build their models and theories in a very typical way, by breaking up with the methodical recommended guidelines. They do not state a hypothesis to corroborate it, or to refute it on the testing bench, nor carry out a research to subject it to all sorts of critiques before the printed exposition of the conclusions. They rather work the other way: they start from the pretended conclusions to construct later the justificatory arguments which can make us believe that those were reached in the end by following a “scientific” way. That is why they usually confound or mix up research with exposition.
Naturally, it is not enough the scientific appearance of a study to take this for granted. It is not enough either to believe that the simple use of the concepts taken from the natural sciences solve the problem of objectivity. It is not enough to substitute “scientific analysis” for “critique” or vice versa. It is true that an analysis of laboratory can be applied to the study of art, to the study of architecture, but, for avoiding falling into a mechanical attitude of evaluation; critique must be present from the beginning to the end; from the very moment the method of research is chosen, the guiding concepts are defined, the first ideas are stated, etc., until the moment the model is created and the conclusions are obtained, even until the final exposition is written. A study is always an initial approach, an essay. For that reason, in order to get closer to objectivity, we must become aware from the beginning of the prejudices that make us choose one approach or another, one treatment of the theme or another. To believe that an analysis of laboratory guarantees in itself an objective critique of art, it is not only a mistake, but in addition it is an illusion, a prejudice. Prejudices do not stay out of the laboratory when the scientist enters in there, but the fact that he works more with samples of materials than with mental objects is such a great help. The critic of art, the critical architect, is more defenceless against prejudices.
For this time, let us see the first two cases only. Let us start by asking ourselves what thing is leading “intuitionist” critics to neglect the resource of reason. Their first argument says that science has failed as it has been incapable of explaining reality, nature. From such an opinion they deduce the idea that rigorous logic and mathematical reasoning also fail if an explanation on the metaphysic part of man is requested. The second argument says that objectivity is valid for dead things only, not for living beings: only things entirely dead stop their transformation. The third argument says that absolute objectivity does not exist as critic and scientist alter the phenomenon with their instruments of analysis, with their senses, with their prejudices. The fourth argument says that the spiritual can be known only from within. The physical belongs to natural science, the spiritual to psychology. In the main, the argument says that we can measure things external to man: his body and the world around, or which he can perceive with their senses, or by the extension of these, but not his inside, not his spirit. For some, it is intuition, for others, it is intersubjectivity or simply subjectivity, the only thing that can reach the essence of man.
It seems to us that the first argument is founded on a philosophical concept, not on a scientific one, of reality. For science, reality is a process or rather a series of processes; consequently, it is not an objective of science to give a complete and definite explanation of reality. It is not a failure of science to limit itself to observe the phenomenal developments by means of models describing them. It is philosophy which aspires to the general truth; science progresses only through theories or hypothesis and the experimental corroboration, correction, or refutation of each of them. The second argument makes objectivity a synonym of physical things, but, as a matter of fact, objectivity is also referring to things or objects–some say disapprovingly “artefacts”– created by mind. Actually, we objectify what our mind captures from reality: thinking is objectified by speaking and writing. This way, a critic or a scientist, or any thinker from present or past, can be studied through his texts left behind. We will not observe directly the subject, but certainly the mental objects created by him.
The third argument, as the above mentioned ones, is founded on an absolutist concept, in this case, of objectivity and analysis. The objective work is mistakenly expected to be infallible and ultimate. Things are quite different; such a work is objective because it defines an object of study and makes an effort to define this accurately according to the most rigorous method, but the result is always an approximation, never an end or an absolute. We often forget that the work of a critic and a scientist is collective. Each of them contribute with a small portion; whether they work in group or alone, provided that they bear in mind that they take part of a generation and a community. The belief in an isolated genius possessing the whole truth, it is not but a romantic vision. The fourth argument favours psychology either for being apparently a science of spirit, or for being traditionally the shelter of some supporters of the philosophy of life and the before mentioned pragmatism. Nevertheless, psychology does not favour–at least not in its history–solely this “intuitionist” approach. All this is a question of a rather biased interpretation, or a partial choice, of what social or natural sciences are at present.
In their quest to overcome the materialist viewpoint, those critics betting on intuition and refuting reason, even accepting the unity of matter and spirit, take refuge in subjectivity forgetting that this one exists not only in connection with the objects and the processes of perception, not only in opposition to objectivity, but above all in connection with material life. For their part, the scientificistic critics fall as well into absolutist concepts. They are convinced that the simple choice of the “scientific method” is guarantee in itself of impartial and objective results, logically rigorous. But this is not thoroughly true. These critics, who sometimes prefer speaking of “analysis”, not of “critique”–because of the itch of analogies–, usually build their models and theories in a very typical way, by breaking up with the methodical recommended guidelines. They do not state a hypothesis to corroborate it, or to refute it on the testing bench, nor carry out a research to subject it to all sorts of critiques before the printed exposition of the conclusions. They rather work the other way: they start from the pretended conclusions to construct later the justificatory arguments which can make us believe that those were reached in the end by following a “scientific” way. That is why they usually confound or mix up research with exposition.
Naturally, it is not enough the scientific appearance of a study to take this for granted. It is not enough either to believe that the simple use of the concepts taken from the natural sciences solve the problem of objectivity. It is not enough to substitute “scientific analysis” for “critique” or vice versa. It is true that an analysis of laboratory can be applied to the study of art, to the study of architecture, but, for avoiding falling into a mechanical attitude of evaluation; critique must be present from the beginning to the end; from the very moment the method of research is chosen, the guiding concepts are defined, the first ideas are stated, etc., until the moment the model is created and the conclusions are obtained, even until the final exposition is written. A study is always an initial approach, an essay. For that reason, in order to get closer to objectivity, we must become aware from the beginning of the prejudices that make us choose one approach or another, one treatment of the theme or another. To believe that an analysis of laboratory guarantees in itself an objective critique of art, it is not only a mistake, but in addition it is an illusion, a prejudice. Prejudices do not stay out of the laboratory when the scientist enters in there, but the fact that he works more with samples of materials than with mental objects is such a great help. The critic of art, the critical architect, is more defenceless against prejudices.
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